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Abstract. The common wisdom argues that, in general, large trades cause large price
changes, while small trades cause small price changes. However, for extremely large price
changes, the trade size and news play a minor role, while the liquidity (especially price gaps
on the limit order book) is a more influencing factor. Hence, there might be other influencing
factors of immediate price impacts of trades. In this paper, through mechanical analysis of
price variations before and after a trade of arbitrary size, we identify that the trade size, the
bid-ask spread, the price gaps and the outstanding volumes at the bid and ask sides of the
limit order book have impacts on the changes of prices. We propose two regression models to
investigate the influences of these microscopic factors on the price impact of buyer-initiated
partially filled trades, seller-initiated partially filled trades, buyer-initiated filled trades, and
seller-initiated filled trades. We find that they have quantitatively similar explanation powers
and these factors can account for up to 44% of the price impacts. Large trade sizes, wide bid-
ask spreads, high liquidity at the same side and low liquidity at the opposite side will cause a
large price impact. We also find that the liquidity at the opposite side has a more influencing
impact than the liquidity at the same side. Our results shed new lights on the determinants of
immediate price impacts.
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1. Introduction
Econophysics is an interdiscipline of physics and economics, which applies methods and ideas
in statistical physics to economic and financial systems [1]. The distribution of assets is one
of the most studied topics in econophysics [1], and in traditional finance as well [2], since
it is the cornerstone of risk management and option pricing. The first work on this topic is
usually traced back to Bachelier in 1900, where the Brownian motion is used to model the
evolution of stock prices [3]. The Gaussian distribution of stock returns was rediscovered by
Osborne in 1959 [4], which is a key assumption in the Black-Scholes option pricing model [5].
A pioneering work was done by Mandelbrot in 1963, who argued that the speculative price
variations of cotton conform to the Le´vy distribution [6], which is a natural followup of his
studies about income distributions [7–10]. Using high-frequency data, Mantegna and Stanley
found that a truncated Le´vy distribution is a better model for the S&P 500 index returns [11].
Further research showed that the returns have power-law tails with the exponent close to three,
known as the inverse cubic law [12–15]. A lot of empirical investigations have been conducted
on financial returns at different time scales in different stock markets over different time
periods, and the distributions are found to have power-law tails with different tail exponents
at short time intervals [16–31], which can be explained by the variational theory for turbulent
signals [32,33]. In addition, it has been shown that the exponent values are universal for three
mature markets that do not display variations with respect to market capitalization or industry
sector [34, 35], which is however not the case for emerging markets [36].
So what causes the power-law tails in stock returns? A well-known adage in Wall
Street states that it takes trading volume to move stock prices. The correlation between price
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fluctuation r∆t and trading volume V∆t has been extensively studied [37]. Dominating evidence
shows that the magnitude of price fluctuation is linearly correlated with the trading volume at
different time scales ∆t from one minute to one month [38–46]:
r∆t = f (V∆t) =
{
V∆t/λ+, for V∆t > 0
V∆t/λ−, for V∆t < 0
(1)
where f is the price impact function and λ is a measure of market liquidity. In addition,
the price-volume relation is asymmetric such that λ+ > λ− > 0, that is, the price impact of
a selling volume is larger than a buying volume of the same size [37]. At the transaction
level, theoretical analyses and empirical evidence shows that the price impact function is
nonlinear [47–60].
Concerning the volume-return relation at the transaction level, we are interested in the
determination of the immediate price impact rk,t+1 of trade size ωk,t for a given stock k. The
immediate price impact can be calculated as follows:
rk,t+1 =
pk,t+1 − pk,t
pk,t
=
ak,t+1 + bk,t+1 − ak,t − bk,t
ak,t + bk,t
, (2)
where pk,t, ak,t, and bk,t are the mid-price, the best ask price and the best bid price right before
the trade, and pk,t+1, ak,t+1, and bk,t+1 are the mid-price, the best ask price and the best bid price
immediately after the trade. Using the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database, Lillo et al unveiled a
master curve for price impact function such that the data collapse onto a single curve [54]:
r
(
ω
〈ω〉
,C
)
= C−γg
(
ω
〈ω〉
1
Cδ
)
, (3)
where r is the shift of logarithmic mid-quote prices right before and after a trade of size ω
occurs, 〈ω〉 is the average volume per trade for each stock, C is the stock capitalization, γ and
δ are two scaling parameters, and g(x) is found to be a concave function and has a power-
law form for large ω. Lim and Coggins performed a similar analysis on the Australian Stock
Exchange and a similar scaling was obtained, where the return and trade size were defined in a
slightly different way by taking into account the intraday pattern effect [55]. Using order flow
data in the Chinese market, Zhou found that trades resulting from filled and partially filled
limit orders have very different price impacts [60]. The price impact of trades from partially
filled orders is constant when the volume is not too large, while that of filled orders shows
a power-law behavior. When the returns and the trade sizes are normalized by their stock-
dependent averages, capitalization-independent scaling laws emerge for both buyer-initiated
and seller initiated trades from filled orders [60]:
rk
〈rk〉
= Ak
(
ωk
〈ωk〉
)α
, (4)
where α ≈ 2/3 and the prefactor Ak = A is independent of stock k and its capitalization.
In the aforementioned studies, the trading volume or trade size is considered as the solo
driving factor of price fluctuations. For larger price fluctuations over a fixed clock time scale
∆t, more determinants of price impact have been investigated. Farmer et al investigated the
transaction data of 16 companies traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in the 4-year
period 1999-2002 and found that large price fluctuations are essentially independent of the
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volume of order, but driven by liquidity fluctuations characterized by the gaps between the
first few price levels on the opposite limit order book [61]. Using the TAQ data for the year
1997 and the order book data from the Island ECN for the year 2002, Weber and Rosenow
argued that a large trading volume alone is not sufficient to explain large price changes and a
lack of liquidity is a necessary prerequisite for the occurrence of large price fluctuations [62].
Joulin et al analyzed the one-minute data of 163 USA stocks and found that news and trading
volume play a minor role in causing large price changes, which is thus conjectured to be
caused by the vanishing of liquidity [63]. Næs and Skjeltorp studied the order flow data from
the Oslo Stock Exchange in Norway and found that price fluctuations are positively correlated
with trade number, a component of trading volume, and negatively correlated with different
liquidity measures [64].
In this work, we perform research on the determinants of immediate price impact defined
in equation (2) in an emerging stock market. This research is designed to have many
differences from the literature. We focus on the immediate price impact after a transaction
occurs and investigate filled and partially filled orders separately. We use three measures for
liquidity based on the bid-ask spread, the standing volume on the limit order book, and the
gaps between successive price levels.
The motivation of this research is the following. As we briefly reviewed above, the
determinants of immediate price impacts have not been investigated for the Chinese stock
market, which is a representative emerging market. Our analysis here goes further by
investigate separately filled and partially filled orders since these two kinds of orders have
nontrivially very different behaviors [60]. We expect that the influencing factors will have
different impacts on the price movement. This research is empirical and not intended for
practical use. The new empirical results obtained in this work thus deepens our understanding
of the dynamics of this specific market. For a given order, when all the independent variables
are known, we can calculate the immediate price impact for sure. However, this treatment for
individual orders can not be generalized to the macroscopic level for a population of orders.
It is thus necessary to perform regression analysis on the data.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in our
study. Section 3 discusses the possible determinants of immediate price impact and specifies
the model. The results are shown in section 4 for individual stocks and in section 5 for all
stocks. We summarize our findings in section 6.
2. Data sets
We use the order flow data of 23 A-share stocks traded on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange
(SZSE) of China in 2003. The A-shares are common stocks issued by mainland Chinese
companies, subscribed and traded in Chinese currency Renminbi, listed on mainland Chinese
stock exchanges, bought and sold by Chinese nationals and approved foreign investors. The
A-share market was open only to domestic investors in 2003. Note that the Chinese stock
market is the largest emerging market in the world and became the second largest stock
market after the USA market in 2009. Our sample stocks were part of the 40 constituent
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Table 1. Basic statistics for the 23 SZSE stocks. The columns give the codes of stocks, the
average returns (〈rPB〉, 〈rPS〉, 〈rFB〉, and 〈rFS〉, multiplied by 1000), the numbers of trades (N,
thousand shares), the fractions of partially filled orders (F), and the industrial sectors.
Code 〈rPB〉 〈rPS〉 〈rFB〉 〈rFS〉 N F Industry
000001 1.19 -1.21 0.03 -0.05 889.7 0.07 Financials
000002 1.55 -1.54 0.04 -0.05 509.4 0.06 Real estate
000009 2.23 -2.25 0.05 -0.06 448.0 0.08 Conglomerates
000012 1.63 -1.61 0.08 -0.10 290.4 0.14 Metals & Nonmetals
000016 1.86 -1.87 0.08 -0.10 188.6 0.15 Electronics
000021 1.35 -1.37 0.07 -0.09 411.6 0.12 Electronics
000024 1.65 -1.63 0.09 -0.09 133.6 0.16 Real estate
000027 1.63 -1.63 0.06 -0.05 313.9 0.08 Utilities
000063 1.27 -1.24 0.07 -0.06 265.5 0.10 IT
000066 1.57 -1.59 0.08 -0.09 277.7 0.14 Electronics
000088 1.63 -1.60 0.10 -0.09 97.2 0.13 Transportation
000089 1.63 -1.64 0.06 -0.07 189.1 0.11 Transportation
000406 1.56 -1.58 0.05 -0.07 271.4 0.13 Petrochemicals
000429 2.35 -2.37 0.08 -0.09 117.4 0.14 Transportation
000488 1.72 -1.62 0.14 -0.17 120.1 0.21 Paper & Printing
000539 1.88 -1.85 0.10 -0.14 114.7 0.14 Utilities
000541 1.56 -1.54 0.09 -0.09 68.7 0.18 Electronics
000550 1.60 -1.59 0.08 -0.09 346.7 0.12 Manufacturing
000581 1.84 -1.80 0.10 -0.10 94.0 0.17 Manufacturing
000625 1.60 -1.61 0.08 -0.10 397.6 0.12 Manufacturing
000709 2.02 -2.04 0.04 -0.05 207.8 0.10 Metals & Nonmetals
000720 0.98 -1.15 0.05 -0.08 132.2 0.16 Utilities
000778 1.38 -1.33 0.07 -0.07 157.3 0.15 Manufacturing
stocks included in the Shenshen Stock Exchange component index in 2003.
The SZSE is open for trading from Monday to Friday except the public holidays and other
dates as announced by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. On each trading day, the
market opens at 9:15 am and entered the opening call auction till 9:25 am, during which the
trading system accepts order submission and cancelation, and all matched transactions are
executed at 9:25 am. It is followed by a cooling period from 9:25 am to 9:30. During cooling
periods, the Exchange is open to orders routing from members, but does not process orders
or process cancelation of orders. The information released to trading terminals also does not
change during cooling periods. All matched transactions are executed at the end of cooling
periods. The continuous double auction operates from 9:30 to 11:30 and 13:00 to 15:00 and
transaction occurs based on automatic one to one matching due to price-time priority. The
market freezes in the time period from 11:30 am to 13:00 pm and no actions could be taken.
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At the daily closure of the market, unexecuted orders will be automatically removed. Only
the trades during the continuous double auction are considered in this work.
Following reference [65], the trades are differentiated into four types according to their
directions (whether a trade is seller-initiated or buyer-initiated) and aggressiveness: buyer-
initiated partially filled (PB) trades resulting from partially filled buy orders, seller-initiated
partially filled (PS) trades resulting from partially filled sell orders, buyer-initiated filled (FB)
trades resulting from filled buy orders, and seller-initiated filled (FS) trades resulting from
filled sell orders. The basic statistics for the 23 SZSE stocks are presented in table 1 [60]. We
note that the 23 stocks investigated in this work are representative, which belong to a variety
of industry sectors as shown in table 1.
Several interesting features can be observed from table 1. First, the majority of trades are
resulted from filled orders, which means that these investors are subjectively more impatient.
Second, we find that the immediate price impacts of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades
are roughly symmetric since
〈rPB〉 ≈ −〈rPS〉 and 〈rFB〉 ≈ −〈rFS〉 (5)
for each stock. Third, partially filled trades have much larger impact on the price than filled
trades [60]:
〈rPB〉 ≫ 〈rFB〉 and − 〈rPS〉 ≫ −〈rFS〉 , (6)
which means that, on average, partially filled trades are much more aggressive than filled
trades, which is confirmed by the fact that partially filled trades have larger sizes. A
mechanical illustration of the third feature will be shown in section 3.
3. Model specification
In order to determine the influence factors of immediate price impact, we show in figure 1 the
evolution of the limit order book and the price formation process of seller-initiated partially
filled orders and filled orders.
Consider the situation that a sell order with price P = pi and size V = 7 is submitted at
time t. Figure 1(a) shows the first five price levels of both sides of the limit order book right
before the placement of an sell order, in which the ask prices, the bid prices and their volumes
are denoted by ai(t−), bi(t−), VAi (t−), and VBi (t−), respectively. Assume that b4(t−) < pi < b3(t−).
At time t, the buy limit orders on the first three price levels are executed, whose trading volume
is ωt = VB1 (t−) + VB2 (t−) + VB3 (t−) = 6. The unexecuted part of the sell order, whose quantity is
V −ωt = 1, is stored on the sell limit order book at time t+, as shown in figure 1(b), where we
have a1(t+) = pi, ai+1(t+) = ai(t−) for i = 1, 2, · · ·, and bi(t+) = bi+3(t−). More generally, if we
have
bn+1(t−) < pi < bn(t−) and
n∑
i=1
VBi (t−) < V, (7)
then the sell order eats buy limit orders waiting on the order book and the new best ask and bid
prices are b1(t+) = bn+1(t−) and a1(t+) = pi < a1(t−). According to equation (2), the immediate
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Figure 1. Schematic illustration of price formation caused by seller-initiated partially filled
orders (a-b) and filled orders (c-d). The numbers above the bars are the volumes at the
corresponding levels.
price impact is
rPS =
pi + bn+1(t−) − a1(t−) − b1(t−)
a1(t−) + b1(t−) (8)
= −
a1(t−) − b1(t−)
a1(t−) + b1(t−) −
b1(t−) − bn+1(t−)
a1(t−) + b1(t−) −
b1(t−) − pi
a1(t−) + b1(t−) . (9)
The first term in the right-hand side of equation (9) indicates that the immediate price impact
rPS of partially filled orders is negatively proportional to the bid-ask spread S (t−). The second
term implies that rPS is negatively proportional to the first n price gaps
GBi (t−) = bi(t−) − bi+1(t−), i = 1, · · · , n, (10)
and correlated with the volumes VBi (t−) on the first n levels i = 1, 2, · · · , n. The correlation
between rPS and VBi (t−) is due to the fact that the value of n is determined by the order book
shape according to equation (7). The third term also indicates that rPS is correlated with
GBi (t−) on the first n levels i = 1, 2, · · · , n. Note that the correlation between rPS and ω can
also be inferred from equation (7). Taking into consideration the finding expressed in equation
(4) [60], we can propose the following model:
rPS(t) = a0 + a [ω(t−)]α + bS (t−) +
n∑
i=1
di
[
VBi (t−)
]β
+
n∑
i=1
fiGBi (t−) + ut, (11)
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where the coefficients a, b and fi are expected to be negative and the di coefficients are
expected to be positive. Similarly, for partially filled buy orders, we can propose the following
model:
rPB(t) = a0 + a [ω(t−)]α + bS (t−) +
n∑
i=1
ci
[
VAi (t−)
]β
+
n∑
i=1
eiGAi (t−) + ut, (12)
where the coefficients a, b and ei are expected to be positive and the ci coefficients are expected
to be negative.
Panels (c) and (d) of figure 1 illustrate the evolution of the limit order book around a
filled sell order. If the sell order is filled such that
pi 6 bn(t−) and
n∑
i=1
VBi (t−) = V, (13)
or
pi 6 bn+1(t−) and
n∑
i=1
VBi (t−) < V <
n+1∑
i=1
VBi (t−), (14)
then the new best ask and bid prices are b1(t+) = bn+1(t−) and a1(t+) = a1(t−). Hence, the
immediate price impact is
rFS =
bn+1(t−) − b1(t−)
a1(t−) + b1(t−) . (15)
The equation implies that rFS is negatively proportional to the first n price gaps GBi (t−) and
correlated with the volumes VBi (t−) on the first n levels i = 1, 2, · · · , n, but independent of the
bid-ask spread. We can thus propose the following model:
rFS(t) = a0 + a [ω(t−)]α +
n∑
i=1
di
[
VBi (t−)
]β
+
n∑
i=1
fiGBi (t−) + ut, (16)
where the coefficients a and fi are expected to be negative and the di coefficients are expected
to be positive. Similarly, for filled buy orders, we can propose the following model:
rFB(t) = a0 + a [ω(t−)]α +
n∑
i=1
ci
[
VAi (t−)
]β
+
n∑
i=1
eiGAi (t−) + ut, (17)
where the coefficients a and ei are expected to be positive and the ci coefficients are expected
to be negative.
It follows immediately from equations (9) and (15) that
rPS − rFS = −
a1(t−) − pi
a1(t−) + b1(t−) = −
a1(t−) − b1(t−)
a1(t−) + b1(t−) −
b1(t−) − pi
a1(t−) + b1(t−) . (18)
whose absolute value is no less than half of the relative bid-ask spread [a1(t−)−b1(t−)]/[a1(t−)+
b1(t−)]. Our data show that 91.05% of the FS trades have rFS = 0, and all price movements
caused by the PS trades are negative, which is not surprising in view of the limit order book
mechanism. These considerations explain why PS trades have much larger price impacts than
FS trades. This analysis applies for buyer-initiated trades as well. We note that 89.42% of the
FB trades have rFB = 0.
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There are possible missing determinants of immediate price impact in the above
discussions. One factor is the liquidity in the same side of the limit order book for executed
buy or sell orders, since the order book shape and the price gaps on the buy and sell sides are
statistically symmetric [66]. Another factor is the intraday patterns found in many financial
quantities including the volatility, the bid-ask spread, and the trading volume. Hence, the
immediate price impact of each type of trades for stock k can be modeled as follows:
rk,t+1 = f (ωk,t, S k,t,VAk,i=1:L,t,VBk,i=1:L,t,GAk,i=1:L,t,GBk,i=1:L,t, Di=1:23,t) + ut, (19)
where Di=1:23,t are dummy variables characterizing the intraday pattern in a resolution of ten
minutes. We consider two types of models. The first type is the following:
rk,t+1
〈rk〉
= a0 + a
(
ωk,t
〈ωk〉
)α
+ bS k,t +
L∑
i=1
ci
V
A
k,i,t
〈ωk〉

β
+
L∑
i=1
di
V
B
k,i,t
〈ωk〉

β
+
L∑
i=1
ei
GAk,i,t
|〈rk〉|
+
L∑
i=1
fi
GBk,i,t
|〈rk〉|
+
23∑
i=1
giDi,t + ut, (20)
where the variables are normalized so that we can put together all the data of different stocks
in the cross-sectional analysis in section 5, following reference [60]. The second model is
expressed as follows:
rk,t+1
〈rk〉
= a0 + a
(
ωk,t
〈ωk〉
)α
+ bS k,t +
L∑
i=1
ci ln
V
A
k,i,t
〈ωk〉
 +
L∑
i=1
di ln
V
B
k,i,t
〈ωk〉

+
L∑
i=1
ei
GAk,i,t
|〈rk〉|
+
L∑
i=1
fi
GBk,i,t
|〈rk〉|
+
23∑
i=1
giDi,t + ut. (21)
For simplicity, we term the model expressed in equation (20) as the power-law model and the
model in equation (21) as the logarithmic model.
Since the size of the data is huge, we preprocess the data for each stock before calibrating
the two models expressed in equations (20) and (21) to reduce the computational time. For
each stock, the average values of rk,t+1, S k,t, VAk,i=1:L,t, VBk,i=1:L,t, GAk,i=1:L,t, and GBk,i=1:L,t of the
trades with the same size ωk,t are used. The parameters a0, a, b, ci, di, ei, and fi are determined
by minimizing the following objective function:
Q(α, β; a0, a, b, ci, di, ei, fi) =
∑
t
u2t . (22)
This least-squares estimation is equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimation only if the
measurement errors are independent and identically distributed Gaussian [67]. However,
this condition may not hold. For stock price movements, it is known that both limit orders
for liquidity provision and market orders for liquidity taking have long memory properties
[68–70], and these two effects usually reconcile to produce diffusive price fluctuations
[68,69,71], be the price impact temporal or permanent [72,73]. On the other hand, we do not
know a priori the distribution of the measurement errors. Therefore, we use this least-squares
estimation in this work. We note that it might underestimate the p-values, which however
should not change the quantitative conclusions.
CONTENTS 10
In order to achieve the global optimization of the power-law model, we scan α and β in
a two-dimensional grid from 0.05 to 0.95 with a spacing step of 0.05. For each pair of α and
β, we can perform a linear least-squares regression to determine the local optimal parameters
and the adjusted R-square, R2-adj. For the logarithmic model, we need to scan α only. The
set of parameters that maximizing the R2-adj is considered as the globally optimal solution.
4. Results for individual stocks
4.1. The case of five levels of liquidity L = 5
For each stock, we have calibrated the power-law model in equation (20) with L = 5 for the
four types of trades, i.e., buyer-initiated partially filled (PB) trades, seller-initiated partially
filled (PS) trades, buyer-initiated filled (FB) trades, and seller-initiated filled (FS) trades. For
each type of trades, the optimal values of α and β are obtained by maximizing the adjusted
R-square (R2-adj).
Taking stock 000001 as an example, we have α = 0.25 and β = 0.15 for PB trades,
α = 0.30 and β = 0.20 for PS trades, α = 0.55 and β = 0.10 for FB trades, and α = 0.45
and β = 0.05 for FS trades. The regression results are shown in Table 2. The F-tests show
that the model is significant for all the four types of trades and the explanatory power of the
variable is very high. For all four types of trades, the normalized immediate price impact r/〈r〉
is positively correlated with the normalized trade size ω and the normalized bid-ask spread S .
However, the relation between r and S is insignificant for the FS trades, which is consistent
with the simple explanation in equation (15). For each type of trades, roughly speaking, the
normalized immediate price impact is positively correlated with the standing volumes on the
same side of the limit order book and the price gaps on the opposite side, and negatively
correlated with the standing volumes on the opposite side and the price gaps on the same side.
In other words, the magnitude of the price impact is large if the liquidity is high on the same
side (large standing volumes and narrow price gaps) or if the liquidity is low on the opposite
side (small standing volumes and wide price gaps). A closer scrutiny unveils that the liquidity
on the same side of the limit order book has a less influence on the price impact. For instance,
all coefficients for VAi and GAi are statistically insignificant for FS trades.
The results for other stocks are quite similar, as summarized in figure 2, where a plus or
minus symbol (+ or -) indicates that the estimated coefficient is positive or negative, and the
symbol is marked in red if the associated coefficient is significant at the 5% level. It is evident
that a larger order causes a greater price impact in magnitude for all four types of trades and
for all individual stocks. For partially filled trades, the price impact is larger if the bid-ask
spread is larger for all stocks, while for filled trades, the spread could have a positive or
negative influence on the price impact. Again, there are more coefficients on the ask side (VAi
and GAi ) that are significant for buyer-initiated trades, and there are more coefficients on the
bid side (VBi and GBi ) that are significant for seller-initiated trades. This finding is consistent
with the mechanical analysis expressed in equations (11), (12), (16), and (17).
Note that we do not show the results of the logarithmic model for individual stocks.
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Table 2. Calibration of the power-law model in (20) with L = 5 for stock 000001. We
obtain that α = 0.25 and β = 0.15 for buyer-initiated partially filled (PB) trades, α = 0.30
and β = 0.20 for seller-initiated partially filled (PS) trades, α = 0.55 and β = 0.10 for buyer-
initiated filled (FB) trades, and α = 0.45 and β = 0.05 for seller-initiated filled (FS) trades. The
numbers in the parentheses are the p-values. The estimates of the coefficients in red indicate
that the associated variables are significant at the 5% level.
Variable PB PS FB FS
R2-adj 0.475 0.501 0.444 0.468
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
a0 0.98 (0.000) 0.51 (0.000) 31.59 (0.000) 30.76 (0.000)
a for ω 1.15 (0.000) 1.06 (0.000) 1.85 (0.000) 2.86 (0.000)
b for S 20.01 (0.000) 31.26 (0.000) 227.19 (0.000) 3.38 (0.635)
c1 for VA1 -1.82 (0.000) 0.08 (0.000) -30.83 (0.000) 1.08 (0.072)
c2 for VA2 -0.28 (0.000) 0.01 (0.405) -8.73 (0.000) 1.26 (0.072)
c3 for VA3 0.01 (0.585) -0.03 (0.065) -1.80 (0.042) 1.35 (0.063)
c4 for VA4 0.08 (0.000) -0.01 (0.430) 2.09 (0.021) 1.03 (0.138)
c5 for VA5 0.01 (0.486) -0.03 (0.032) 3.46 (0.000) 1.30 (0.053)
d1 for VB1 0.18 (0.000) -1.43 (0.000) 2.30 (0.005) -36.45 (0.000)
d2 for VB2 -0.05 (0.049) -0.26 (0.000) -1.37 (0.143) -11.77 (0.000)
d3 for VB3 0.00 (0.944) -0.03 (0.048) 0.66 (0.509) 0.24 (0.751)
d4 for VB4 0.03 (0.147) 0.02 (0.148) -0.60 (0.538) 2.61 (0.000)
d5 for VB5 -0.15 (0.000) 0.00 (0.852) 1.80 (0.057) 4.82 (0.000)
102e1 for GA1 4.56 (0.000) -0.19 (0.187) 0.51 (0.000) 0.12 (0.160)
102e2 for GA2 1.77 (0.000) 0.40 (0.099) 0.92 (0.002) -0.05 (0.652)
102e3 for GA3 0.58 (0.022) 0.77 (0.009) -0.81 (0.031) 0.24 (0.077)
102e4 for GA4 0.22 (0.376) -0.28 (0.292) 2.37 (0.000) 0.19 (0.216)
102e5 for GA5 -0.06 (0.826) 0.51 (0.030) 0.43 (0.429) 0.41 (0.006)
102 f1 for GB1 -0.73 (0.000) 4.50 (0.000) -0.07 (0.759) 0.54 (0.000)
102 f2 for GB2 -1.06 (0.001) 2.96 (0.000) -0.29 (0.346) 1.03 (0.000)
102 f3 for GB3 -0.07 (0.855) -0.29 (0.426) 0.23 (0.595) 0.46 (0.024)
102 f4 for GB4 0.57 (0.155) -0.01 (0.972) 0.46 (0.304) 0.51 (0.015)
102 f5 for GB5 0.35 (0.282) -0.48 (0.173) 0.33 (0.416) -0.21 (0.321)
The dependent matrices for several stocks are is rank deficient within machine precision
(singular, close to singular or badly scaled), such that no regression results can be obtained.
For the stocks with nonsingular dependence matrix, the results are qualitatively similar to
those obtained from the power-law model.
4.2. The case of two levels of liquidity L = 2
Figure 2 shows that most coefficients of VAi and GAi (respectively VBi and GBi ) for buyer-
initiated (respectively seller-initiated) trades are insignificant when i > 3. We thus set L = 2
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Figure 2. Schematic illustration of coefficient significance in the power-law model (20) with
L = 5 for individual stocks: (a) buyer-initiated partially filled trades, (b) seller-initiated
partially filled trades, (c) buyer-initiated filled trades, (d) seller-initiated filled trades. A plus
or minus means that the corresponding coefficient is positive or negative, respectively. Red
symbols (+ and −) indicate that the corresponding variables are significant at the 5% level,
while black symbols (+ and −) mean that the corresponding variables are insignificant at the
5% level.
and regress the power-law model to the data again. The results for stock 000001 are presented
in table 3. In this case, we find that α = 0.25 and β = 0.15 for buyer-initiated partially
filled trades, α = 0.30 and β = 0.20 for seller-initiated partially filled trades, α = 0.55 and
β = 0.10 for buyer-initiated filled trades, and α = 0.45 and β = 0.10 for seller-initiated filled
trades. The F-tests show that the model is significant for all the four types of trades and the
explanatory power of the variables is very high. We observe that the values of the power-law
exponents α and β are closed to their counterparts in the case of L = 5 in table 2.
In table 3, the GA2 coefficient with the p-value being 0.022 for the PS trades is regarded
as insignificant since the the GA1 coefficient is insignificant. Comparing table 3 with table 2,
we find that the corresponding coefficients are close to each other with similar significance
levels. However, the coefficients of VA1 and VA2 become significant when L decreases from 5
to 2. This is not surprising since the two p-values for VA1 and VA2 are only slightly greater than
5% when L = 5, and the removal of variables in the regression model changes the p-values
slightly.
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Table 3. Calibration of the power-law model with L = 2 for Stock 000001. We obtain that
α = 0.25 and β = 0.15 for buyer-initiated partially filled trades, α = 0.30 and β = 0.20 for
seller-initiated partially filled trades, α = 0.55 and β = 0.10 for buyer-initiated filled trades,
and α = 0.45 and β = 0.10 for seller-initiated filled trades. The numbers in the parentheses are
the p-values. The estimates of the coefficients in red indicate that the associated variables are
significant at the 5% level.
Variable PB PS FB FS
R2-adj 0.473 0.500 0.438 0.464
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
a0 1.08 (0.000) 0.44 (0.000) 44.80 (0.000) 19.82 (0.000)
a for ω 1.16 (0.000) 1.06 (0.000) 1.82 (0.000) 2.88 (0.000)
b for S 20.43 (0.000) 31.37 (0.000) 222.18 (0.000) 3.19 (0.654)
c1 for VA1 -1.83 (0.000) 0.07 (0.000) -30.60 (0.000) 0.99 (0.000)
c2 for VA2 -0.25 (0.000) -0.00 (0.932) -8.52 (0.000) 0.96 (0.001)
d1 for VB1 0.18 (0.000) -1.45 (0.000) 2.94 (0.000) -16.81 (0.000)
d2 for VB2 -0.04 (0.052) -0.26 (0.000) -1.06 (0.233) -4.83 (0.000)
102e1 for GA1 4.54 (0.000) -0.17 (0.238) 0.46 (0.000) 0.12 (0.182)
102e2 for GA2 1.82 (0.000) 0.55 (0.022) 0.89 (0.003) -0.04 (0.708)
102 f1 for GB1 -0.71 (0.000) 4.50 (0.000) -0.04 (0.853) 0.60 (0.000)
102 f2 for GB2 -0.89 (0.007) 2.95 (0.000) -0.19 (0.533) 1.06 (0.000)
The regression results for all individual stocks are illustrated in figure 3, where the
meaning of the symbols are the same as in figure 2. Similar patterns are observed. We
can reach a conclusion that the trade size, the bid-ask spread (a liquidity measure known as
market width), and the market depth at the first few price levels on the opposite limit order
book plays a major role in determining the price impact of a trade.
4.3. Asymmetrical impacts of buyer- and seller-initiated trades
It has long been known that market reacts differently to buy and sell orders, and sell orders
have a larger price impact than purchases [74]. The regression results enable us to investigate
the possible buy-sell asymmetry in the impacts of different influence factors. Figure 4 shows
a comparison of the absolute values of the coefficients a, b, c1, d1, e1, and f1 among the four
types of trades for individual stocks.
According to figure 4(a), there is no buy-sell asymmetry caused by trade sizes for
partially filled trades since the a values for PB and PS trades are close to each other. In
contrast, FS trades have larger a values than FB trades for most stocks, such that an FS trade
has a larger price impact than an FB trade of the same size.
According to figure 4(b), there is no buy-sell asymmetry caused by bid-ask spreads for
partially filled trades. Concerning filled trades, the majority of the stocks exhibit buy-sell
asymmetry where a lack of liquidity (i.e., wide bid-ask spread) results in larger price impacts
for FB trades than for FS trades.
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Figure 3. Schematic illustration of coefficient significance in the power-law model (20) with
L = 2 for individual stocks: (a) buyer-initiated partially filled trades, (b) seller-initiated
partially filled trades, (c) buyer-initiated filled trades, (d) seller-initiated filled trades. A plus
or minus means that the corresponding coefficient is positive or negative, respectively. Red
symbols (+ and −) indicate that the corresponding variables are significant at the 5% level,
while black symbols (+ and −) mean that the corresponding variables are insignificant at the
5% level.
Figure 4(c,e) shows that the depth of the limit order book on the ask side, VAi and GAi , has
larger price impacts on buyer-initiated trades than on seller-initiated trades. In contrast, figure
4(d,f) shows that the depth of the limit order book on the bid side, VBi and GBi , has larger
price impacts on seller-initiated trades than on buyer-initiated trades. These observations
are consistent with the results obtained in previous sections, stating that the liquidity at the
opposite side has greater influence on the price impact than the liquidity at the same side.
5. Cross-sectional regression for all stocks
In section 4, we have performed analysis on individual stocks. In this section, we perform a
cross-sectional analysis of all stocks. Both the power-law model and the logarithmic model
are considered. In the regression, the normalized data for each variable are put together
correspondingly and we use L = 5 in the two models.
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Figure 4. Comparison of the absolute values of the coefficients (a, b, c1, d1, e1, and f1) among
the four types of trades for individual stocks. Curves are red for buyer-initiated trades and
green for seller-initiated trades. Symbols are open for partially filled trades and solid for filled
trades.
5.1. The power-law model
Regressing the power-law model, we obtain that α = 0.25 and β = 0.20 for buyer-initiated
partially filled trades, α = 0.30 and β = 0.20 for seller-initiated partially filled trades, α = 0.55
and β = 0.05 for buyer-initiated filled trades, and α = 0.50 and β = 0.05 for seller-initiated
filled trades. The estimated coefficients are presented in table 4, where the estimates that are
significant at the 5% level are marked in red. The R-squares from the F-tests show that the
model is significant for all four types of trades. We observe that the determinants (ω, S , VAi ,
VBi , GAi and GBi ) and the dummy variables can account for 43.6% of the price impact for PB
trades, 22.2% for PS trades, 40.2% for FB trades, and 39.6% for FS trades.
For buyer-initiated partially filled trades, the normalized price impact is positively
correlated with the trade size ω, the bid-ask spread S and the limit order volumes VBi at
the bid side, and negatively correlated with the price gaps GBi on the bid limit order book. For
the two liquidity measures at the ask side, the situation is a little bit complicated. We observe
that c1 and c2 are negative and c3, c4 and c5 are positive for the ask limit order volumes, and e1
and e2 are positive and e3, e4 and e5 are negative for the ask price gaps. However, it is found
that |c1 + c2| ≫ |c3 + c4 + c5| and |e1 + e2| ≫ |e3 + e4 + e5|, which means that the first two levels
dominate. We thus argue that the normalized price impact is negatively correlated with the ask
order volume and positively correlated with the ask price gaps. Further more, table 4 shows
that |c1+c2+c3+c4+c5| ≫ |d1+d2+d3+d4+d5| and |e1+e2+e3+e4+e5| ≫ | f1+ f2+ f3+ f4+ f5|,
which implies that the liquidity at the ask side of the limit order book plays a major role on
the price impact when compared with the liquidity at the bid side.
Similarly, for seller-initiated partially filled trades, the normalized price impact is
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Table 4. Cross-sectional regression results of the power-law model in (20) with L = 5 for
all stocks. We obtain that α = 0.25 and β = 0.20 for buyer-initiated partially filled trades,
α = 0.30 and β = 0.20 for seller-initiated partially filled trades, α = 0.55 and β = 0.05 for
buyer-initiated filled trades, and α = 0.50 and β = 0.05 for seller-initiated filled trades. The
numbers in the parentheses are the p-values. The estimates of the coefficients in red indicate
that the associated variables are significant at the 5% level.
Variable PB PS FB FS
R2-adj 0.436 0.222 0.402 0.396
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
a0 0.40 (0.000) 0.90 (0.000) 34.74 (0.000) 18.67 (0.000)
a for ω 1.26 (0.000) 1.15 (0.000) 1.81 (0.000) 2.49 (0.000)
b for S 20.48 (0.000) 20.96 (0.000) 6.45 (0.000) -1.39 (0.149)
c1 for VA1 -1.423 (0.000) 0.084 (0.000) -48.380 (0.000) 1.242 (0.000)
c2 for VA2 -0.139 (0.000) 0.062 (0.000) -10.806 (0.000) 1.623 (0.000)
c3 for VA3 0.027 (0.000) 0.009 (0.364) 3.947 (0.000) 1.421 (0.000)
c4 for VA4 0.048 (0.000) 0.028 (0.004) 5.312 (0.000) 1.150 (0.000)
c5 for VA5 0.024 (0.000) -0.010 (0.273) 4.390 (0.000) 1.454 (0.000)
d1 for VB1 0.099 (0.000) -1.532 (0.000) 3.273 (0.000) -31.612 (0.000)
d2 for VB2 0.062 (0.000) -0.194 (0.000) 1.645 (0.000) -5.179 (0.000)
d3 for VB3 0.047 (0.000) -0.000 (0.984) 1.978 (0.000) 2.195 (0.000)
d4 for VB4 0.042 (0.000) 0.031 (0.001) 1.453 (0.000) 3.703 (0.000)
d5 for VB5 0.022 (0.000) 0.015 (0.111) 3.123 (0.000) 4.052 (0.000)
102e1 for GA1 3.785 (0.000) -0.360 (0.000) 0.957 (0.000) 0.053 (0.000)
102e2 for GA2 0.569 (0.000) -0.367 (0.000) 0.361 (0.000) 0.041 (0.012)
102e3 for GA3 -0.195 (0.000) -0.411 (0.000) 0.361 (0.000) 0.038 (0.036)
102e4 for GA4 -0.431 (0.000) -0.354 (0.000) -0.055 (0.259) 0.004 (0.822)
102e5 for GA5 -0.411 (0.000) -0.391 (0.000) 0.030 (0.531) 0.042 (0.016)
102 f1 for GB1 -0.239 (0.000) 3.475 (0.000) 0.142 (0.000) 0.721 (0.000)
102 f2 for GB2 -0.362 (0.000) 0.508 (0.000) 0.052 (0.125) 0.217 (0.000)
102 f3 for GB3 -0.487 (0.000) -0.263 (0.000) -0.077 (0.040) 0.028 (0.156)
102 f4 for GB4 -0.249 (0.000) -0.551 (0.000) -0.021 (0.583) -0.037 (0.062)
102 f5 for GB5 -0.386 (0.000) -0.413 (0.000) -0.024 (0.501) -0.042 (0.008)
positively correlated with the trade size ω, the bid-ask spread S , the ask volumes and the
bid price gaps on the book, and is negatively correlated with the bid volumes and the ask price
gaps on the limit order book. In addition, the liquidity at the opposite side of the order book
plays a more influencing role than the liquidity at the same side.
For filled trades, large trade size, wide bid-ask spread, large market depth at the same
order book side, and small market depth at the opposite order book side may cause a larger
normalized price impact. There are three exceptions. First, the coefficient f1 for FB trades is
positive, which is nevertheless much smaller than e1 + e2 + e3. Second, the coefficients e1, e2
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and e3 for FS trades are positive, whose sum is however much smaller than f1 + f2. Third, the
coefficient b for FS trades is insignificant.
5.2. The logarithmic model
We also perform cross-sectional regression of the logarithmic model expressed in equation
(21). We obtain that α = 0.15 for buyer-initiated partially filled trades, α = 0.20 for seller-
initiated partially filled trades, α = 0.55 for buyer-initiated filled trades, and α = 0.50 for
seller-initiated filled trades. The results are presented in table 5. The p-values of the F-tests
indicate that the model is significant for all four types of trades. The determinants (ω, S , VAi ,
VBi , GAi and GBi ) and the dummy variables can account for 42.5% of the price impact for PB
trades, 21.6% for PS trades, 40.1% for FB trades, and 39.6% for FS trades.
Comparing the estimated coefficients (excluding a0) in table 5 with those in table 4, we
find that they have exactly the same pattern, except that b3 for PS trades becomes significant
in the logarithmic model. Therefore, the two models lead to the same conclusions.
5.3. The connection between the two models
The difference between the two models is that there are power-law terms of the volumes in
the power-law model (20) and alternative logarithmic terms of the volumes in the logarithmic
model (21). If 0 < β ≪ 1, we have
Vβ = eβ ln V ≈ 1 + β ln V. (23)
It follows that equation (20) becomes
rk,t+1
〈rk〉
= a0 +
L∑
i=1
(ci + di) + a
(
ωk,t
〈ωk〉
)α
+ bS k,t +
L∑
i=1
ciβ ln
V
A
k,i,t
〈ωk〉

+
L∑
i=1
diβ ln
V
B
k,i,t
〈ωk〉
 +
L∑
i=1
ei
GAk,i,t
|〈rk〉|
+
L∑
i=1
fi
GBk,i,t
|〈rk〉|
+
23∑
i=1
giDi,t + ut. (24)
A comparison of the coefficients of equations (24) and (21) gives that aln0 = apl0 +
∑L
i=1(cpli +dpli ),
aln = apl, bln = bpl, elni = e
pl
i , f lni = f pli , and
clni = c
pl
i β, and d
ln
i = d
pl
i β. (25)
These equations are validated according to table 5 and table 4, except for the first one about
a0. Particularly, figure 5 is to verify equation (25). It is found in figure 5(a) that the points
locate around the dashed diagonal line y = x. A linear regression gives that
y = 1.074x + 0.003. (26)
where y contains the data of clni and dlni , and x contains the data of c
pl
i β and d
pl
i β. To have
a better visibility of the points with small values, we plot the absolute values on the log-
log scales in figure 5(b). We find that several data points for the PS trades deviate the most
from y = x, where the most deviated point is for d3. The observation of these deviations is
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Table 5. Cross-sectional regression results of the logarithmic model in (21) with L = 5 for all
stocks. We obtain that α = 0.15 for buyer-initiated partially filled trades, α = 0.20 for seller-
initiated partially filled trades, α = 0.55 for buyer-initiated filled trades, and α = 0.50 for
seller-initiated filled trades. The numbers in the parentheses are the p-values. The estimates
of the coefficients in red indicate that the associated variables are significant at the 5% level.
Variable PB PS FB FS
R2-adj 0.425 0.216 0.401 0.396
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
a0 -1.60 (0.000) -1.16 (0.000) 0.80 (0.000) -1.28 (0.000)
a for ω 2.06 (0.000) 1.70 (0.000) 1.78 (0.000) 2.48 (0.000)
b for S 20.55 (0.000) 20.89 (0.000) 6.42 (0.000) -1.58 (0.101)
c1 for VA1 -0.254 (0.000) 0.022 (0.000) -2.617 (0.000) 0.064 (0.000)
c2 for VA2 -0.031 (0.000) 0.015 (0.000) -0.595 (0.000) 0.092 (0.000)
c3 for VA3 0.005 (0.000) 0.003 (0.245) 0.204 (0.000) 0.080 (0.000)
c4 for VA4 0.011 (0.000) 0.006 (0.004) 0.302 (0.000) 0.067 (0.000)
c5 for VA5 0.005 (0.000) -0.001 (0.661) 0.260 (0.000) 0.080 (0.000)
d1 for VB1 0.024 (0.000) -0.266 (0.000) 0.173 (0.000) -1.676 (0.000)
d2 for VB2 0.014 (0.000) -0.047 (0.000) 0.079 (0.000) -0.279 (0.000)
d3 for VB3 0.011 (0.000) -0.005 (0.035) 0.104 (0.000) 0.110 (0.000)
d4 for VB4 0.009 (0.000) 0.004 (0.077) 0.074 (0.000) 0.196 (0.000)
d5 for VB5 0.005 (0.000) -0.001 (0.783) 0.164 (0.000) 0.213 (0.000)
102e1 for GA1 3.775 (0.000) -0.352 (0.000) 0.936 (0.000) 0.050 (0.000)
102e2 for GA2 0.552 (0.000) -0.349 (0.000) 0.352 (0.000) 0.042 (0.009)
102e3 for GA3 -0.188 (0.000) -0.394 (0.000) 0.371 (0.000) 0.038 (0.036)
102e4 for GA4 -0.434 (0.000) -0.331 (0.000) -0.043 (0.376) 0.004 (0.809)
102e4 for GA5 -0.405 (0.000) -0.386 (0.000) 0.039 (0.417) 0.042 (0.017)
102 f1 for GB1 -0.231 (0.000) 3.448 (0.000) 0.136 (0.000) 0.716 (0.000)
102 f2 for GB2 -0.348 (0.000) 0.485 (0.000) 0.052 (0.128) 0.211 (0.000)
102 f3 for GB3 -0.479 (0.000) -0.296 (0.000) -0.077 (0.040) 0.024 (0.230)
102 f4 for GB4 -0.241 (0.000) -0.564 (0.000) -0.027 (0.481) -0.036 (0.069)
102 f5 for GB5 -0.393 (0.000) -0.407 (0.000) -0.026 (0.462) -0.039 (0.012)
consistent with the facts that, for the PS trades, the adjusted R-squares is the smallest and that
the associated value of β = 0.2 is not very close to zero.
With the above analysis, we can say that the power-law model and the logarithmic model
are in essence equivalent in explaining the immediate price impact.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we have analyzed the mechanism of immediate price impact by investigating
the trade size, the bid-ask spread, the standing volumes of the first few price levels at the
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Figure 5. Scatter plot of clni against c
pl
i β and dlni against d
pl
i β. The dashed lines are y = x and
the solid line is a linear fit.
bid and ask sides of the limit order book, and the price level gaps. We have proposed two
regression models, which have quantitatively similar explanatory powers. We found that
large trade sizes, wide bid-ask spreads, high liquidity at the same side and low liquidity at the
opposite side will cause large price impacts. For most individual stocks, together with other
determinants, the liquidity information at the first two price levels on the limit order book is
sufficient to have a high explanatory power. When a cross-sectional regression is performed,
it is better to include more price levels. Asymmetrical impacts have been unveiled for several
investigated measures. Especially, the coefficient of spread for FB orders is significant, while
that for FS orders is insignificant.
More interestingly, we have investigated separately filled orders and partially filled
orders. For instance, consider PB orders and FB orders. We found that the coefficient of
spread for PB orders is larger than for FB orders (bPB > bFB), the coefficient magnitude of VA1
for PB orders is smaller than for FB orders (|c1,PB| < |c1,FB|), and the coefficient of GA1 for PB
orders is larger than for FB orders (e1,PB > e1,FB). These observations are consistent with the
fact that filled orders are more aggressive than partially filled orders so that liquidity changes
have a greater impact on FB orders than PB orders. The results in this work thus extend
previous work on the relationship between immediate price impact and order size [60].
We note that the results in this work are seemingly different from some of previous
works [61–63]. This is not surprising since we are analyzing all price impacts, large or small,
while those previous works focus on large price changes [61–63], where the liquidity is found
to play a major role and the trade size plays a minor role. In contrast, we showed that both
trade size and liquidity (characterized by a measure of market width and two measures of
market depth) affect the magnitudes of immediate price impacts. The importance of trade
sizes is consistent with earlier works [54, 55, 60]. Further more, our analysis here uncovers
more determinants of immediate price impacts.
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